

The FANNING RESEARCH CORPORATION

## RECEIPT

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**RECEIPT is acknowledged of the following classified data and it is recognized that they come within the purview of the security agreement.**

ADDRESSEE Mr. Arthur C. Lundhal

Washington, D. C.

DATE July 6, 1967


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ATTENTION

MATERIAL

W67-727, Copy 1, SECRET. Ltr. to Mr. Arthur C. Lundhal from  25X1  
Vice President for Eastern Operations,  dtd 7/6/67, 25X1  
Subj: Classified. 1 pg. secret ltr, w/2 Atchs;  
Atch A - 1 pg. secret; Atch B - 2 pgs secret.



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Signature in full

Please sign and return original to:

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25X1

July 6, 1967

Mr. Arthur C. Lundahl  
Director  
National Photographic Interpretation Center  
Washington, D. C.

aa

Dear Arthur:

[redacted] was pleased to submit a proposal for assisting NPIC in its Materials Handling Program. Budgetary considerations, I understand, inhibited the initiation of the systems analysis phase. I have consequently prepared for your consideration several alternative approaches which you may find to be of significant interest.

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Attachments A and B are brief outlines of these approaches and further details will be furnished as requested.

Sincerely,

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Enclosures: A and B

AW/jkb

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## ATTACHMENT A

I. MATERIALS HANDLING PROGRAM

## A. General Statement of Problem:

Information storage, retrieval, and handling pose a continuous problem for all members of the intelligence community. NPIC is faced with the dilemma of having and receiving too much material for efficient handling by its present system. This, coupled with the knowledge that information pertinent to estimates and decisions is present but not effectively available due to insufficient storage, retrieval and handling, poses a serious threat to the intelligence process.

Several specific problem areas have been delineated by NPIC in an effort to effect adequate and timely solutions. These are:

The advisability of using cut film or "chips" in conjunction with, or in lieu of, roll film, considering methods for storing, retrieving, reproducing, and controlling the imagery materials.

Methods for improving access to, storing, retrieving, reproducing, controlling, and updating imagery derived from previous coverage, irrespective of sensor.

Means of improving access to, storing, retrieving, reproducing, controlling and updating textual data.

Methods for storing, retrieving, and displaying maps and charts and plots, and methods for automatically transporting the various forms of materials or the information contained therein from one location to another within the building.

## B. Recommended Approach:

The ideal approach for dealing with these inter-related areas would be an integrated systems analysis followed by a systematic system design and subsequent implementation. Since inadequate funding prohibits this approach, and due to the recognized urgency of the situation, [ ] proposes 25X1 an alternative evolutionary plan for achieving the desired goals and objectives. This modular approach involves the detailed consideration of the highest priority problem area within the context of the broad program outlined above. In this respect the advisability of using cut film or "chips" in conjunction with, or in lieu of, roll film, appears to be the most urgent material handling problem requiring immediate attention. Consequently, [ ] recommends that a comprehensive systems analysis be performed 25X1 in this area immediately. This analysis and the subsequent design and implementation would provide NPIC with an operational capability in this most important area and further more lend insight into its interrelationships with the remaining elements of the total system. In this manner, as funding becomes available, various aspects of the total program can be treated, either independently or concurrently with little if any duplication of effort.

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## ATTACHMENT B

II. EXPANSION OF THE BLIP:

Currently the BLIP outputs prepared in the Center represent the best summarization of the photographic and textual intelligence source material coverage for COMOR targets available to the intelligence community. In both the machine listings and the EDP print tapes, from which they are derived, for more than 5000 high priority targets all source materials are listed, indexed and evaluated and the highly pertinent textual information is carried in abstract form. Detailed comparisons have been made, at ACIC, between all source hard copy materials available to the organization and those indexed and abstracted in BLIP. For the COMOR targets in the BLIP it was found that the coverage is so complete that it is unnecessary for ACIC to index and abstract from the hard copy materials. When target annotations are made to graphics the BLIP not only provides for COMOR targets, identification of the best materials that should be drawn for use (since evaluation ratings of the quality of the materials are given) but it also frequently obviates the need to draw the hard copy when abstracted information suffices. The savings in time to review, evaluate, index, and abstract the materials are substantial.

Unfortunately, the indexing and abstracting of source materials for the 19000 plus non-COMOR targets has not been comprehensive and in the comparisons of hard copy to BLIP entries it was found at ACIC that a large percentage of the source materials were not entered. As a result, evaluation, indexing, and abstracting of information from the materials covering the non-COMOR targets consumes a substantial block of manpower as well as other resources required to establish and operate automated files at three different security levels. While this is not intended as criticism, since it is a function of target priorities and availability of manpower to enter the information, it has been observed that there is extensive duplication of the review, indexing and abstracting of the same source materials at a large number of other DOD organizations. The advantages of having an expanded BLIP to provide EDP tapes or machine listings with index/abstract coverage for all BLIP target materials for community use are evident. Although a substantial commitment of manpower resources would be required to give the non-COMOR targets full coverage, it is quite possible that a system supported by a number of major community organizations could be established. The Center could in this way manage a community BLIP contributed to and used by all the organizations concerned. Much duplication of all source material exploitation could thus be minimized and the benefits of the analysis performed at the various organizations could be maximized. Standardization and control exercised by the Center would assure quality and integrity of the BLIP and its expanded outputs would be available to Center users.

Other physical handling problems connected with the BLIP such as the inability to sort and rearrange the print tapes, so that outputs can be tailored to individual user needs, the current difficulties of updating

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the BLIP necessitate changes in the BLIP EDP system. An historical record capability should also be established since COMOR targets drop from the BLIP listings once the intelligence collection requirements are satisfied.

In the view of the above considerations, [ ] recommends that a systems analysis, design and implementation effort be undertaken to:  
1) examine the requirements of the major community users for an expanded BLIP, with their specific target coverage and output needs; 2) develop the concept and design of a community support system; 3) provide a plan with alternatives for system implementation, specifying the resource requirements; and, 4) provide the technical support to deliver an operational system.

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